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Abstract:	By	popularising	 interest	 in	 inequality	Thomas	Piketty’s	Capital	 in	 the	
Twenty‐First	Century	has	made	a	significant	contribution.	It	has	helped	to	change	
the	basic	terms	of	debate	regarding	wealth	and	income.	However,	Capital	exhibits	
several	weaknesses.	The	overall	statement	of	Piketty’s	3	laws	tends	to	confuse	the	
reader	by	conflating	capital	with	all	forms	of	wealth,	and	capital	with	the	current	
market	 valuation	 of	wealth	 assets.	 The	whole	 creates	 a	 form	of	 empiricism	by	
metrics	or	calibration.	The	aggregation	also	lends	itself	to	data	as	history	rather	
than	 historically	 grounded	 explanation	 of	 evidence.	 Concomitantly,	 it	 lacks	 a	
theorisation	of	capitalism,	of	power,	of	the	state,	of	social	movements	and	social	
transformations.	This	affects	the	way	in	which	possible	solutions	to	inequality	are	
directed,	creating	an	inherent	conservativism.	However,	it	does	provoke	further	
grounds	for	ethical	counterargument	productive	of	more	progressive	solutions	to	
the	problems	it	highlights.		
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Introduction	
	
In	the	neoliberal	age	we	have	naturalised	the	rich.	However,	the	success	of	Thomas	
Piketty’s	Capital	in	the	Twenty‐First	Century	has	done	a	great	deal	to	legitimate	a	
rather	differently	inflected	concern.	It	is	now	permissible	to	ask:	can	we,	should	
we,	afford	the	rich?		
	
Growing	 income	 and	wealth	 inequality	 have	 gradually	 become	 areas	 of	 public	
concern	but	this	concern	has	become	more	acute,	and	more	politically	febrile,	in	
the	wake	of	the	global	financial	crisis.	The	election	victory	by	Syriza	in	Greece,	and	
the	Occupy	Movement	speak	directly	to	this.	Austerity	responses	to	the	crisis	have	
distributed	the	fallout	costs	to	the	many	from	the	few	who	benefitted	most	from	
the	preceding	decades.	Meanwhile,	 central	bank	policy	 responses	have	 created	
new	opportunities	for	the	global	rich	to	become	even	richer.i	To	a	large	degree	the	
idea	 that	 the	rest	of	us	are	dragged	along	 in	 the	wake	of	 the	wealthy	has	been	
exposed	 as	 a	 myth.	 Returns	 captured	 (rather	 than	 created)	 by	 the	 rich	 have	
affected	the	many,	and	not	just	in	a	financial	sense.	The	associated	fiscal	and	policy	
effects	 on	 welfare,	 health	 systems,	 pensions,	 collective	 union	 activity	 and	 our	
simple	sense	of	community	cohesion	and	quality	of	life,	rather	than	quantity	and	
materiality,	 have	all	 been	harmed.	And	 this	 is	 just	 in	 the	Global	North.	 For	 the	
Global	South	second	best	 “development”	 forms	have	 fuelled	 the	North	 in	many	
ways,	 creating	 the	 underlying	 deflationary	 effects	 that	 have	 kept	 the	 North	
consuming	as	well	as	contributing	to	the	current	account	imbalances	that	lead	to	
capital	flows	for	asset	bubbles.	In	return	the	Global	South	has	experienced	its	own	
problems	 as	 its	 nation’s	 reproduce	 the	 same	 socio‐economic	 cleavages	 as	 the	
North.	In	2014	Forbes	identified	2,325	billionaires,	an	increase	of	more	than	10%	
on	2013	and	190	of	these	were	in	China.						
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	Inequality	now	matters	more	to	political	and	economic	elites	and	the	ordinary	
citizen,	albeit	from	different	ends	of	the	same	reasoning	focused	on	the	economics	
of	political	stability	‐	protection	of	the	right	to	what	is	“mine”	within	the	status	quo	
versus	 a	 deep	 sense	 of	 injustice.	 A	 great	 deal	 has	 now	been	written	 regarding	
Piketty’s	work	(see	Fullbrook	&	Morgan	eds.	2014).	It	is	widely	acknowledged	to	
be	 the	 well‐intentioned	 product	 of	 an	 engaged	 and	 highly	 reasonable	 social	
democrat;	 one	 unfairly	 demonised	 at	 various	 times	 as	 a	 data	 manipulating	
unreconstructed	Marxist	 –	 in	 places	where	 such	 an	 appellation	 is	 a	 pejorative	
term.ii		
	
The	 key	 questions	 arising	 from	 Capital	 are:	 Can	 it	 galvanise	 opinion	 in	 an	
appropriate	 way	 or	 will	 it	 become	 more	 of	 a	 hindrance	 than	 a	 help	 in	
understanding	contemporary	capitalism,	and	in	constructing	alternatives?	Yanis	
Varoufakis,	Greece’s	short‐tenured	finance	minister,	certainly	thinks	it	will	prove	
a	hindrance	(Varoufakis,	2014).	In	many	respects	one	might	argue	that	Capital	has	
become	successful	precisely	because	of	its	flaws.	It	is,	as	Robert	Wade	has	noted,	
“reassuringly	 conventional	 in	 its	 analysis	 and	 prescriptions,	 and	 so	 less	
threatening	 to	 familiar	ways	of	 thought,”	 (Wade,	2014:	p.	 11).	 It	 is	 radical,	 but	
principally	 in	 the	 conservative	 context	 of	mainstream	 economics.	 Beyond	 that	
context	 one	 might	 describe	 it	 as	 a	 palatable	 form	 of	 radicalism	 whose	
constructions,	 concessions,	 and	 omissions	 undermine	 its	 capacity	 to	 carry	 the	
weight	of	expectation	placed	upon	it.		
	
Capital	in	brief	
	
1.	The	Core	Argument	
	
Piketty’s	 core	claim	 is	 that	 there	 is	a	basic	 tendency	 in	capitalism	 for	 stocks	of	
wealth	 (assets)	 and	 flows	 of	 income	 (both	 from	 assets	 and	 work)	 to	 become	
concentrated.	Capitalism	has	no	inherent	mechanisms	that	serve	to	prevent	this.	
Economies	do	not	automatically	 self‐equilibrate	 in	ways	 that	 lead	also	 to	more	
equal	distributions	of	wealth	and	income.	Economic	growth	and	development	do	
not	lead	necessarily	to	Kuznet	effects,	where	over	time	wealth	and	income	become	
more	evenly	distributed	within	nations.iii	It	is	only	through	two	situations	that	the	
basic	tendency	towards	inequality	can	be,	and	has	in	the	past,	been	offset.	First,	by	
wars	and	severe	economic	disasters.	These	can	wipe	out	existing	concentrations	
of	wealth	and	also	affect	the	immediate	capacity	to	earn	significant	income	based	
on	the	current	ownership	and/or	control	of	assets.	Here,	events	can	serve	to	reset	
actual	 wealth	 and	 income.	 Such	 events	 also	 create	 pressures	 for	 institutional	
arrangements,	and	these	provide	a	second	way	in	which	restrictions	can	be	placed	
on	 the	 potential	 to	 accumulate	wealth	 and	 to	 earn	 unequal	 income.	 Rules	 and	
regulations	(welfare	states,	progressive	taxation	and	redistributive	systems	etc.)	
combine	with	socialised	restraints	or	customs	(cultures	that	limit	the	claims	on	
income	and	assets	of	elites	who	have	positional	power	that	could	be	exploited	for	
greater	gain).	It	is	inherent	to	Piketty’s	argument	that	these	two	situations,	war	
and	 reactive	 institutional	 arrangements,	 are	 temporary	and	non‐necessary.	 The	
long‐term	unconstrained	tendency	is	towards	concentrations	and	inequality.		
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Piketty	 notes	 that	 “Intellectual	 and	 political	 debate	 about	 the	 distribution	 of	
wealth	has	long	been	based	on	an	abundance	of	prejudice	and	a	paucity	of	fact	[…	
and	 there	 is	 therefore]	 a	 role	 for	 research	 that	 is	 at	 least	 systematic	 and	
methodical,	if	not	fully	scientific”	(Piketty,	2014:	p.	3).	His	argument	is	presented	
as	emerging	from	an	empirical	form	of	historical	analysis.	He	produces	important	
data	but	the	question	then	arises,	to	what	degree	has	he	explained	the	past	and	
outlined	 the	 reasons	why	a	 given	 future	may	unfold?	What	makes	 a	 fact	 a	 fact	
worth	knowing	in	a	particular	way?	Here,	the	initial	concepts	matter.	
	
The	historical	analysis	is	primarily	focused	on	tracking	“the	respective	shares	of	
global	income	going	to	labor	and	capital	and	on	how	those	shares	have	changed	
since	the	eighteenth	century”	(Piketty,	2014:	p.	39).	Piketty’s	purpose	is	“not	to	
plead	the	case	of	workers	against	owners	but	rather	to	gain	as	clear	as	possible	a	
view	of	reality”	(Piketty,	2014:	p.	40).	He	identifies	a	key	role	for	“the	historical	
evolution	of	the	capital/income	ratio”	(see	below,	Piketty,	2014:	p.	viii).	He	states	
that	he	will	 “use	 the	words	capital	and	wealth	 interchangeably,	as	 if	 they	were	
perfectly	synonymous,”	(Piketty,	2014:	p.	47),	and	then	defines	capital	as,	“the	sum	
total	 of	 nonhuman	 assets	 that	 can	 be	 owned	 and	 exchanged	 on	 some	market.	
Capital	 includes	all	 forms	of	 real	property	 (including	residential	 real	estate)	as	
well	as	financial	and	professional	capital	(plant,	infrastructure,	machinery,	patents	
and	so	on)	used	by	 firms	and	government	agencies”	(Piketty,	2014:	p.	46).	The	
important	point	here	is	the	inclusion	of	financial	assets	and	that	these	can	be	of	
any	form	and	owned	by	anyone.		
		
Piketty’s	 investigation	 requires	 data	 on	 shares	 of	 national	 income	 and	
accumulated	values	of	owned	assets.	He	collectively	refers	to	the	latter	as	national	
capital	defined	as	“the	total	market	value	of	everything	owned	by	the	residents	
and	governments	of	a	given	country	at	a	given	point	in	time,	provided	that	it	can	
be	traded	on	some	market,”	(Piketty,	2014:	p.	48;	emphasis	added	–	this	becomes	
important	later,	national	capital	is	expressed	as	a	percentage	of	annual	national	
income,	for	example,	400%).		
	
The	availability	of	the	relevant	data	for	Piketty’s	inquiry	requires	a	nation	to	have	
some	interest	in	collection.	As	he	notes,	reliable	data	on	annual	income	tends	to	
follow	 from	 the	 implementation	 of	 an	 income	 tax,	 data	 on	wealth	 tends	 to	 be	
available	for	earlier	periods	based	on	a	broader	range	of	sources	(aggregations	
from	valuations	for	inheritance,	estate	taxes	etc.,	but	requires	more	ingenuity	to	
capture).	In	the	earliest	national	cases,	data	availability	typically	follows	from	the	
need	to	finance	wars	or	restructure	in	the	wake	of	revolution	or	transformation.	
It	tends	to	be	associated	with	the	gradual	emergence	of	complexly	administered	
and	bureaucratic	mercantile	and	then	industrial	states,	often	accompanied	by	the	
work	of	a	pioneer	in	political	economy	(Piketty,	2014:	pp.	16‐20,	55‐9).	In	later	
cases	 it	 is	 based	 on	 the	 demands	 for	 conformity	 from	 regional	 and	 global	
governance	organizations	such	as	the	World	Bank.		
	
Piketty’s	historical	analysis	and	its	“global”	ambition	is	based	on	initially	few	cases	
that	 are	 assumed	 to	 be	 “generalisable”	 and	 then	 on	 what	 gradually	 becomes	
available	(much	of	it	stored	in	the	World	Top	Incomes	Database).	His	oldest	and	
most	 continuous	 sources	 are	 Britain	 and	 France	 beginning	 from	 around	 1700,	
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followed	by	Germany,	the	United	States	and	Sweden	from	around	1800,	the	rest	
of	 Europe	 and	 Japan	 from	 the	 early	 twentieth	 century,	 and	 extending	 to	 other	
nations	of	the	world	through	the	second	half	of	the	twentieth	century.iv		
	
Based	 on	 the	 available	 data	 Piketty	 identifies	 a	 significant	U	 shape	 in	 national	
capital	 for	 individual	 states	 and	 for	 Europe	 and	America	 collectively.	 The	 total	
value	 of	 accumulated	 capital	 assets	 falls	 in	 the	 early	 to	 mid	 decades	 of	 the	
twentieth	 century	 and	 then	 begins	 to	 recover	 from	World	War	 II	 (see	 Piketty,	
2014:	 p.	 165).	 This	 is	 a	 period	 of	war	 and	 economic	 calamity,	which	 destroys	
capital	(though	less	so	in	the	United	States)	and	resets	the	ownership	of	wealth,	
shifting	some	from	the	private	to	the	public	(see	also	Piketty,	2014:	p.	147).	It	also	
leads	to	initial	effects	on	the	share	of	income	so	that	in	the	period	thereafter	there	
are	institutional	breaks	on	inequality	of	income	and	(to	a	lesser	degree)	private	
wealth,	which	initially	prevent	a	rapid	rise	in	inequality	of	wealth	(a	concentration	
based	on	shares	of	the	accumulation	of	national	capital).v	However:				
	
The	shocks	that	buffeted	the	economy	in	the	period	1914‐1945	–	World	
War	I,	the	Bolshevik	Revolution	of	1917,	the	great	Depression,	World	War	
II,	and	the	consequent	advent	of	new	regulatory	and	tax	policies	along	with	
controls	on	capital	–	reduced	capital’s	share	of	income	to	historically	low	
levels	in	the	1950s.	Very	soon,	however,	capital	began	to	reconstitute	itself.	
The	growth	of	 capital’s	 share	accelerated	with	 the	victories	of	Margaret	
Thatcher	 in	England	 in	1979	and	Ronald	Reagan	 in	 the	United	States	 in	
1980,	marking	the	beginning	of	a	conservative	revolution	[…]	By	2010,	and	
despite	the	crisis	that	began	in	2007‐2008	capital	was	prospering	as	it	had	
not	done	so	since	1913.	(Piketty,	2014:	p.	42)			
	
So,	the	post	WWII	prosperity	phase	in	world	economic	history	combined	greater	
income	equality,	redistributive	state	policies,	and	regulatory	restraints	on	capital.	
The	Reagan/Thatcher	counter	revolution	facilitated	a	historical	reversal	of	these	
historical	 conditions,	 corresponding	 with	 the	 onset	 of	 the	 era	 of	 neoliberal	
economic	globalization.	
	
For	Piketty,	the	mid	twentieth	century	is	an	exception	to	the	basic	tendencies	for	
wealth	 and	 income	 inequality	 to	 grow.	 This	 then	 leads	 to	 a	 focus	 on	 the	 re‐
emergence	of	inequality	of	income	and	wealth.	Piketty	finds	that	the	top	deciles	
income	share	in	the	United	States	rises	from	around	33%	of	total	income	in	1970	
to	more	than	48%	in	2010,	whilst	in	Europe	it	rises	from	around	30%	to	35%,	but	
with	 significant	 variation;	 for	 example,	 the	 UK	 figures	 are	 28%	 to	 42%	whilst	
Sweden’s	are	around	26%	to	28%	(Piketty,	2014:	pp.	323‐4).	The	top	deciles	share	
of	total	wealth	increased	in	the	United	States	from	around	65%	in	1970	to	over	
70%	in	2010,	and	in	Europe	from	around	60%	in	1970	to	around	65%	in	2010,	
again	with	significant	variation	between	states	(Piketty,	2014:	p.	349).	In	terms	of	
wealth	share,	moreover,	there	are	also	concentration	augmentations	as	one	moves	
to	the	top	centile	or	1%	and	then	top	0.1%.	The	top	1%	in	the	United	States	owned	
almost	35%	of	all	national	wealth	in	2010.	The	contemporary	significance	of	these	
trends	for	the	financial	crisis	is	made	clear	for	the	United	States	in	particular:			
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In	my	view	there	is	absolutely	no	doubt	that	the	increase	in	inequality	in	
the	 United	 States	 contributed	 to	 the	 nation’s	 financial	 instability.	 The	
reason	 is	 simple:	 one	 consequence	 of	 increasing	 inequality	 was	 virtual	
stagnation	of	the	purchasing	power	of	the	lower	and	middle	classes	in	the	
United	States,	which	inevitably	made	it	more	likely	that	modest	households	
would	take	on	debt	(Piketty,	2014:	p.	297)				
	
Note	the	underlying	underconsumptionist	stance	here,	consequent	upon	a	secular	
trend	 to	 stagnating	 or	 declining	 real	 wages	 in	 significant	 advanced	 capitalist	
economies	over	the	past	several	decades.	
	
Piketty’s	point	is	that	the	top	echelons	of	society	have	in	recent	decades	been	the	
recipients	 of	 the	 majority	 of	 growth	 in	 national	 income,	 with	 the	 inevitable	
implication	that	the	rest	of	society	have	not	been	direct	beneficiaries	of	growth.	
For	example,	the	“bottom	90%”	in	the	United	States	saw	income	growth	of	0.5%	
per	year	1977‐2007,	whilst	the	top	1%	took	a	total	of	60%	of	growth	in	national	
income	(Piketty,	2014:	p.	294).	As	Piketty	notes,	“It	is	hard	to	imagine	an	economy	
and	 society	 that	 can	 continue	 functioning	 indefinitely	 with	 such	 extreme	
divergence	 between	 social	 groups,”	 (Piketty,	 2014:	 p.	 297).	Moreover,	 this	 has	
continued	since	the	financial	crisis.	For	example,	 the	top	1%	were	recipients	of	
more	than	90%	of	the	increase	in	national	income	2009‐2012	in	the	United	States.	
So,	 the	 recent	 global	 economic	 crisis	 has	 not	 (unlike	 in	 the	 twentieth	 century)	
served	 to	reset	 income	and	wealth	potentials	along	more	egalitarian	 lines.	One	
might	note	here	Eichengreen’s	 contrast	 between	 the	Great	Depression	 and	 the	
Great	 Recession	 (2015).	 He	 suggests	 that	 the	 character	 of	 the	 initial	 crisis	
response	 to	 the	 latter	 rendered	 a	more	 dramatic	 set	 of	 transformations	 in	 the	
institutions	and	structure	of	the	global	capitalist	economic	system	less	possible,	
while	potentially	thereby	sewing	the	seeds	of	future	systemic	crisis.	
	
Piketty’s	analysis	of	his	data	 is	 far	more	detailed	 than	can	be	set	out	here.vi	He	
covers	 France,	 Britain	 and	 the	 United	 States	 at	 great	 length	 and	 then	 the	
aggregates	for	Europe	and	some	extension	to	the	rest	of	the	world	(for	example,	
Piketty,	2014:	pp.	460‐3).	The	work	is	577	pages	plus	notes.	So	the	figures	stated	
serve	merely	to	illustrate	the	general	form	of	his	findings.vii	His	underlying	point	
is	 that	 the	 data	 seems	 to	 express	 a	 return	 to	 the	 trends	 prior	 to	 his	 period	 of	
exception	in	the	early‐to‐mid	twentieth	century.	However,	his	analysis	also	makes	
clear	 that	 a	 return	 is	 not	 a	 rerun.	 There	 are	 significant	 differences.	 Wealth	
concentrations	were	different	in	the	eighteenth	and	nineteenth	centuries	because	
societies	 contained	 different	 mixes	 of	 potential	 assets	 based	 on	 the	 way	
economies	 were	 structured.	 Agricultural	 land	 dominated	 and	 then	 later	
commercial	and	industrial	enterprises	emerged	and	the	joint	stock	company	was	
eventually	created.	The	period	prior	to	the	twentieth	was	also	one	of	insignificant	
inflation	 (Piketty,	 2014:pp.	 102‐9).	 A	 social	 elite	 could	 rely	 on	 returns	 to	 their	
assets	(since	nominal	and	real	were	the	same),	and	inheritance	meant	wealth	was	
readily	transmitted.	A	class	of	rentiers	dominated	a	highly	unequal	society	–	an	
idle	rich.	However,	today’s	rich	include,	and	this	is	most	developed	in	the	United	
States,	also	the	working	rich	–	the	“supermanagers”	or	executives	who	effectively	
control	 their	 own	 compensation	 culture	 (Piketty,	 2014:	 pp.	 264‐5,	 277‐8).	
Inheritance	 still	 matters	 more	 than	 the	 public	 might	 think	 and	 the	 rise	 of	
	 6
supermanagers	has	not	been	a	product	of	a	more	socially	mobile	and	in	this	sense	
meritocratic	society,	since	the	majority	do	not	become	more	mobile	because	a	tiny	
fraction	achieve	success	(Piketty,	2014:	pp.	378,	417,	424).		
	
Underlying	difference	is	a	basic	enduring	relation,	as	the	scale	of	wealth	increases	
the	returns	that	can	be	commanded	based	on	the	scale	of	that	wealth	also	increase.	
So	the	returns	to	the	wealthy	are	not	just	bigger	because	of	scale,	they	are	bigger	
because	scale	creates	effects	on	the	ability	to	earn	more	per	unit	of	wealth.	This	is	
the	 same	 for	 both	 the	 modern	 idle	 rich	 and	 the	 working	 rich,	 though	 not	
necessarily	 always	 for	 the	 same	 reasons.	 Great	 wealth	 creates	 access	 to	more	
lucrative	 investment	 opportunities	 (insider	 information,	 better	 investment	
management	based	on	the	rules	of	systems	and	how	they	can	be	exploited	etc),	
and	so	annual	income	can	be	greater	for	the	idle	rich.	Since,	the	working	rich	also	
control	 huge	 assets	 they	 can	 structure	 their	 own	 compensation	 to	 extract	
significant	proportions	of	the	income	earned	by	those	assets	(via	stock	options,	
tax	privileges	etc).	In	both	cases	the	net	effect	is	that	wealth	creates	more	wealth	
through	capturing	more	of	the	income	created	in	the	economy.	Hence	the	effects	
Piketty	identifies	–	relative	gains	to	the	top	10%	1%	and	0.1%	at	the	expense	of	
the	rest.	Piketty	describes	this	as	the	return	to	“patrimonial	capitalism”	–	a	society	
dominated	by	 concentrations	of	 private	wealth	 –	 albeit	 one	 that	now	has,	 as	 a	
residue	of	the	twentieth	century	transformations	that	once	benefitted	the	many,	a	
minority	owning	(in	a	national	capital	sense)	patrimonial	middle	class	(Piketty,	
2014:	p.	173,	237,	260‐1).		
	
2.	The	3	lawsviii	
	
Intuitively	Piketty’s	data	suggests	that	there	is	an	internal	set	of	mechanisms	that	
render	societies	steadily	more	unequal.	This	brings	us	to	Piketty’s	3	“laws”.	The	
headline	claims	are	clearly	summarised	pp.	20‐27.	The	first	chapter	contains	the	
initial	 reference	 to	 his	 3	 laws,	 and	 states	 the	 first.ix	One	 should	 note	 here	 that	
Piketty	 is	 intermittently	 critical	 of	 some	 of	 the	 characteristics	 of	 modern	
economics:	
	
To	put	it	bluntly,	the	discipline	of	economics	has	yet	to	get	over	its	childish	
passion	 for	 mathematics	 and	 for	 purely	 theoretical	 and	 often	 highly	
ideological	 speculation,	 at	 the	 expense	 of	 historical	 research	 and	
collaboration	with	the	other	social	sciences.	Economists	are	all	too	often	
preoccupied	 with	 petty	 mathematical	 problems	 of	 interest	 only	 to	
themselves.	This	obsession	with	mathematics	is	an	easy	way	of	acquiring	
the	 appearance	 of	 scientificity	 without	 having	 to	 answer	 the	 far	 more	
complex	questions	posed	by	the	world	we	live	in.	(Piketty,	2014:	p.	32)			
		
His	statement	omits	several	of	the	reasons	why	economists	express	their	ideas	in	
mathematical	form.x	It	carries	intellectual	capital	to	do	so,	it	is	simply	expected,	it	
is	part	of	being	taken	seriously	as	an	economist,	and	it	enables	one	to	add	a	degree	
of	authority	in	the	form	of	conditional	certainty	to	one’s	claims	on	both	the	past	
and	future.	It	gives	a	sense	of	order	and	“theory”	to	what	would	otherwise	just	be	
metrics,	albeit	important	ones.	Data	becomes	not	just	what	happens,	but	a	pattern	
that	 can	 be	 discerned	 and	 then	 an	 actual	 expressible	 tendency.	 However,	 the	
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mathematical	form	is	not	the	data,	it	is	a	way	of	expressing	the	relations	one	thinks	
one	finds	in	the	data	in	a	convenient	symbolic	shorthand.	Without	the	shorthand	
these	are	often	things	one	could	simply	state	in	ordinary	language	terms	based	on	
the	raw	data	–	when	x	does	one	thing	y	will	often	do	another.	Ordinary	language	
tends	to	lead	to	the	requirement	to	add	a	“because”	to	the	statement.	However,	
once	 rendered	 in	 symbolic	 form	 it	 can	 appear	 as	 though	 something	 has	 been	
explained	 even	 though	 “because”	 may	 be	 omitted	 or	 severely	 attenuated,	
particularly	 where	 a	 quantity	 relation	 is	 simply	 stated.	 It	 need	 not	 be	 an	
explanation,	 it	 involves	no	necessary	whys,	 it	can	be	 just	a	way	of	translating	a	
claim	from	words	to	symbols.	This	is	essentially	what	Piketty’s	first	two	laws	are	
and	this	affects	his	third	law.	This	matters	because	it	creates	a	tension	in	terms	of	
the	statement	“an	easy	way	of	acquiring	the	appearance	of	scientificity	without	
having	to	answer	the	far	more	complex	questions	posed	by	the	world	we	live	in.”	
It	is	important	to	highlight	that	the	general	gravitas	that	mathematics	provides	in	
a	 social	 science	 context	 can	 conceal	 the	 limits	 of	 any	 given	 mathematical	
expression,	and	obfuscate	regarding	the	lack	of	adequate	further	explanation.		
	
Piketty	has	 a	 very	 loose	 sense	of	what	 a	 law	 is.	He	 refers	 to	his	 throughout	 as	
“fundamental	laws	of	capitalism”	and	sometimes	links	the	phrasing	with	reference	
to	the	“deep	structures	of	capitalism”	implying	that	the	former,	in	the	absence	of	
further	elaboration,	arise	out	of	the	latter.	However,	as	he	clearly	acknowledges	
his	first	law	is	simply	an	identity,	a	first	move	in	creating	a	definition	that	can	then	
be	used	to	subsequently	express	his	main	claim	about	growing	inequality	in	the	
following	 laws.	 Piketty	 is	 interested	 in	 exploring	 shares	 of	 national	 income,	
specifically	the	increasing	share	flowing	to	what	he	defines	as	capital,	which	then	
can	be	used	to	establish	how	wealth	accumulates.	Accordingly	he	needs	first	to	
define	capital’s	share	of	national	income,	for	which	he	uses	the	symbol	α.	So	the	
first	law	is	(Piketty,	2014:	p.	52):	
	
α	=	r	x	β			
*Capitals	 share	 of	 national	 income	 equals	 the	 rate	 of	 return	 on	 capital	
multiplied	by	the	capital	/income	ratio	
	
r	is	the	rate	of	return	on	capital.	This	is	the	%	return	to	the	owner	of	an	asset.	β	is	
the	capital/income	ratio.	This	simply	means	the	total	stock	of	capital	expressed	in	
terms	of	 the	 amount	of	 income	generated	 in	 a	 given	period.	 It	 is	 the	historical	
accumulation	of	the	value	of	assets	(all	wealth)	in	terms	of	the	value	of	the	current	
annual	period	of	income	generation.	The	historic	accumulation	is	all	the	wealth	
that	can	receive	the	rate	of	return.	The	more	of	it	there	is	as	a	proportion	of	current	
income	generation	then	the	more	of	that	income	will	flow	to	capital.	So	a	higher	
rate	of	return	and/or	a	higher	accumulation	of	historic	capital	on	which	returns	
can	be	earned	eats	up	more	of	the	share	of	current	income	generation.	As	such	the	
first	 law	 just	 states	 capital’s	 share	 is	 created	 by	 the	 rate	 of	 return	 and	 by	 the	
relative	size	of	accumulated	capital.	As	both	of	these	rise	so	capital’s	share	must	
rise.								
	
Piketty	then	asks	how	one	might	state	the	potential	for	the	capital	income	ratio	to	
increase.	How	does	one	express	a	simple	mechanism	by	which	national	 income	
translates	into	more	or	less	accumulating	capital?	Here,	Piketty	assumes	that	if	an	
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economy	is	saving	more	rather	than	consuming	then	more	of	its	income	is	going	
to	create	capital	assets	(based	on	his	definition	of	capital).	So	as	the	savings	rate	
as	a	%	of	national	income	increases	then	capital	will	accumulate	and	there	will	be	
more	capital	to	earn	the	rate	of	return	and	so	more	of	income	over	time	will	be	
capital’s	 share	 (in	 the	 first	 law).	However,	 if	 the	 economy	 is	 growing	 then	 the	
savings,	 which	 create	 more	 capital,	 are	 progressively	 part	 of	 an	 ever	 larger	
economy	 and	 so	 the	 rate	 of	 increase	 of	 capital’s	 share	 as	 a	 proportion	 of	 the	
economy	may	be	 lower.	This	 leads	to	Piketty’s	second	law,	which	simply	states	
that	the	capital/income	ratio	is	dependent	on	the	rate	of	saving	compared	to	the	
rate	of	growth	of	the	economy.	A	faster	growing	economy	does	not	accumulate	
capital	 (measured	 proportionately	 rather	 than	 in	 simple	 absolute	 levels)	 as	
quickly	 for	any	given	saving	 rate	 (remembering	savings	represent	 capital).	 	He	
states	this	as	(Piketty,	2014:	p.	166)	
	
β	=	s/g	
	
The	capital/income	ratio	equals	the	annual	savings	rate	divided	by	the	rate	
of	growth	of	national	income	
	
β	again	means	the	capital/income	ratio,	s	means	the	annual	saving	rate	expressed	
as	 a	 %,	 and	 g	 the	 rate	 of	 growth	 of	 national	 income.	 Piketty	 notes	 that	 the	
significance	of	the	effects	of	s/g	ought	to	be	assessed	in	the	long	term,	smoothing	
out	 any	 volatility	 over	many	 years	 to	 identify	 the	 basic	 trend	 effect	 on	 β.	 The	
assumption	 is	 that	 over	 time	 the	 savings	 rate	 compared	 to	 the	 growth	 rate	
provides	a	way	to	express	the	dynamics	of	how	capital	accumulates	in	comparison	
to	national	income	and	so	s/g	converges	on	β	(e.g.	if	s/g	is	6	for	long	enough	then	
β	will	be	600%).	
	
So	far	we	have	two	simple	statements	of	relations.	The	first	implies	that	as	the	rate	
of	return	increases	and/or	the	relative	size	of	accumulated	capital	increases	then	
capital’s	 share	 of	 national	 income	will	 increase.	 The	 second	 implies	 that	 since	
savings	create	capital,	then	the	higher	the	savings	rate	as	a	%	of	national	income,	
the	faster	capital	will	accumulate,	but	that	this	is	offset	by	faster	economic	growth,	
which	 slows	 down	 the	 relative	 growth	 of	 accumulated	 capital	 compared	 to	
national	income.	Lower	growth,	therefore,	implies	a	more	rapid	potential	for	the	
relative	 accumulation	 of	 capital	 and,	 as	 a	 consequence	 an	 increase	 in	 capital’s	
share	of	national	income	in	the	first	law.								
	
The	 simple	mechanics	 of	 how	different	 components	 of	 Piketty’s	 first	 two	 laws	
interact	 lead	 to	 his	 third	 law.	 The	 first	 two	 laws	 imply	 that	 capital’s	 share	 of	
national	income	is	likely	to	rise	because	capital	will	accumulate	relative	to	national	
income.	It	then	matters	who	owns	that	capital,	since	it	is	the	owners	of	capital	who	
will	receive	the	growing	share	of	national	income.	The	vast	majority	of	Piketty’s	
work,	is	concerned	with	establishing	that	capital	is	in	the	main	held	privately,	is	
influenced	by	inheritance	and	is	also	concentrated	in	few	hands.	So,	the	laws	then	
become	a	way	to	state	that	as	capital	accumulates	and	its	share	of	national	income	
rise	it	is	those	who	own	more	that	will	benefit	more	and	their	very	ownership	will	
over	time	augment	their	wealth.		Moreover,	given	the	distribution	of	ownership	
and	also	(of	income	from	work)	then	inequality	will	simply	continue	to	accumulate	
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into	the	future,	particularly	if	the	rate	of	return	on	capital	does	not	fall	as	capital	
accumulates,	and	if	the	rate	of	return	exceeds	the	rate	of	economic	growth,	since	
this	will	likely	lead	to	more	rapid	growth	in	capital’s	share	based	on	the	first	law	
and	with	less	offsetting	in	the	second	law.	So,	over	time	more	and	more	of	national	
income	will	be	eaten	up	by	returns	to	capital	and	more	and	more	of	that	capital	
will	be	concentrated	in	fewer	hands.	Piketty	states	this	third	law	as	a	“fundamental	
inequality,”	acknowledging	that	it	is	a	“contingent	historical	proposition,	which	is	
true	in	some	periods	and	political	contexts	and	not	in	others,”	(Piketty,	2014:	pp.	
25,	358):	
	
r	>	g			
	
where	 r	 is	 the	 rate	of	 return	earned	by	 capital	 and	g	 is	 the	growth	of	national	
income.xi 	For	 Piketty,	 this	mathematical	 inequality	 is	 a	 “fundamental	 force	 for	
divergence”	(Piketty,	2014:	p.	424).	For	it	to	be	so	then	one	needs	to	either	assume	
or	establish	 that	 the	rate	of	return	 to	capital	 is	relatively	constant	(rather	than	
falling)	and	that	the	long‐term	state	of	growth	is	low.	Piketty	does	this	on	a	global	
basis	and	he	uses	this	to	connect	the	past	and	future.		
	
Note:	 these	 patterns	 of	 accentuated	 tendency	 to	 concentration	 of	 capital	 are	
discernible	in	many	countries	over	the	period	of	neoliberal	economic	globalization,	
and	contribute	to	a	global	tendency	towards	increasing	oligarchization	of	wealth.	
The	 contingent	 historical	 conditions	 that	 have	 facilitated	 such	 concentration	
include	weakened	regulatory	regimes	on	capital,	weakened	redistributive	policies,	
weakened	labour	rights,	and	weakened	or	lax	tax	regimes	that	enable	systematic	
tax	avoidance	by	high	net	worth	individuals	and	corporations.	
	
Piketty	makes	 the	 point	 that	 the	 long‐term	 rate	 of	 global	 growth,	 rather	 than	
individual	national	growth,	has	always	been	relatively	low	in	%	terms.	Moreover,	
whilst	 there	 has	 been	 a	 step‐change	 increase	 in	 growth	 after	 the	 industrial	
revolution,	and	this	has	extended	because	of	the	spread	of	industrialisation	and	
trade	 through	 the	 catch‐up	 of	 developing	 nations,	 one	 cannot	 augment	 global	
growth	forever	through	dissemination	effects.	If	one	looks	also	to	the	underlying	
technological	 basis	 of	 change	 then	 growth	 in	 total	 may	 be	 higher	 after	 the	
industrial	revolution	but	it	is	much	lower	than	one	might	expect	in	toto	(achieving	
its	highest	rate	of	2.5%	in	the	period	1950‐1980,	but	tending	to	be	around	1%	less	
than	 this). xii 	Piketty	 then	 uses	 this	 as	 context	 for	 r	 >	 g.	 Growth	 seems	 to	 be	
constrained	and	one	can	project	this	forward.	There	is,	however,	no	similar	limit	
on	 the	 claim	 of	 capital	 assets	 to	 a	 rate	 of	 return	 (Piketty,	 2014:	 pp.	 353,	 360;	
however,	see	later).xiii		
	
Piketty	then	takes	it	that	one	can	work	on	the	basis	of	say	r	of	4‐5%	(scaled	for	the	
privileged)	and	long	term	g	tending	towards	1	to	1.5%,	but	with	variation	based	
on	catch‐up	(Piketty	2014:	pp.	95‐102,	563).	He	then	assumes	that	if	there	is	“no	
significant	political	reaction	that	will	alter	the	course	of	capitalism	and	financial	
globalization”,	and	no	radical	 technological	breakthrough	 transforming	growth,	
then	there	is	no	reason	to	expect	any	change	in	r	>	g	over	the	next	century,	and	
perhaps	even	“the	next	two	centuries”	(Piketty,	2014:	pp.	353‐358).	Capital	will	
continue	 to	 accumulate	 and	 concentrate	 (perhaps	 even	 “indefinitely”,	 Piketty,	
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2014:	p.	519).	This	 claim	 is	made	despite	 the	statement	by	Pikety	 that	 current	
levels	of	inequality	in	the	United	States	mean	“It	is	hard	to	imagine	an	economy	
and	 society	 that	 can	 continue	 functioning	 indefinitely	 with	 such	 extreme	
divergence	between	social	groups,”	(Piketty,	2014:	p.	297).		Clearly,	the	long‐term	
political	 consequences	 of	 extreme	 inequality	 demands	 more	 exploration,	
including	 the	 probability	 that	 increasingly	 authoritarian	 capitalist	 states	 will	
emerge	to	preside	over	such	highly	unequal	societies	in	future.	
	
In	any	case,	 the	quote	 	 is	 indicative	 that	Piketty	 is	not	 committing	himself	 in	a	
simple	sense	to	an	underlying	determinism.	He	is	rather	creating	context	for	an	
institutional	solution	to	a	problem	that	cannot	simply	be	assumed	will	solve	itself,	
i.	 e.	 the	 need	 for	 a	 deconcentration	 of	 capital.	 In	 the	 context	 of	 addressing	
mainstream	 economics	 and	 neoclassical	 ways	 of	 posing	 a	 problem	 his	 own	
discussion	and	model	building	is	an	understandable	discursive	move.	It	leads	to	
the	final	part	of	the	book	where	Piketty	makes	the	case	that	since	the	problem	of	
r	>	g	appears	to	be	universal,	based	on	a	simple	expression	of	the	mechanics	of	
capitalism,	and	since	the	beneficiaries	of	it	are	increasingly	mobile	and	global,	then	
a	solution	must	also	be	global,	specifically	a	progressive	global	tax	on	capital	as	
private	wealth	(perhaps	achieved	in	steps	beginning	with	regional	agreements).	
The	 actual	 rate	 can	 be	 low	 since	 initially	 the	 tax	 needs	 to	 embed	 and	 its	 very	
existence	creates	information	and	starts	a	process	of	socialisation	to	new	rules.xiv	
Moreover,	as	an	annual	tax	rather	than	a	sporadic	levy	the	take	will	be	cumulative	
and,	for	Piketty,	the	point	is	not	to	radically	expropriate	nor	“to	finance	the	social	
state	but	to	regulate	capitalism.	The	goal	is	first	to	stop	the	indefinite	increase	of	
inequality	of	wealth,	and	second	to	 impose	effective	regulation	on	the	 financial	
and	banking	system	in	order	to	avoid	crises,”	(Piketty,	2014:	p.	518).Here	Pikkety	
moves	in	conjuncture	with	those	who	advocate	strengthening	state	authority	over	
private	financial	actors	and	markets,	seeking	measures	to	correct	past	mistakes	
and	enhance	overall	systemic	stability	in	the	wake	of	the	global	financial	crisis	(see	
Morgan	and	Sheehan,	2015).		Pikkety	states	his	goals	modestly.	
	
I	was	vaccinated	for	life	against	the	conventional	but	lazy	rhetoric	of	anti‐
capitalism	[…]	I	have	no	interest	in	denouncing	inequality	or	capitalism	per	
se	–	especially	since	social	inequalities	are	not	in	themselves	a	problem	as	
long	as	they	are	justified,	that	is,	“founded	only	upon	common	utility,”	as	
article	 I	 of	 the	 1789	 Declaration	 of	 the	 Rights	 of	 Man	 and	 the	 Citizen	
proclaims	 […]	 I	 am	 interested	 in	contributing,	however	modestly,	 to	 the	
debate	about	the	best	way	to	organize	society	and	the	most	appropriate	
institutions	and	policies	to	achieve	a	just	social	order.	(Piketty,	2014:	p.	32)			
	
For	 Piketty,	 whatever	 its	 faults	 or	 “imperfections”	 Capital	 is	 a	 work	 in	 the	
construction	of	facts,	a	historical	analysis	seeking	out	data	to	answer	an	important	
socio‐economic	 question.	 The	 pursuit	 of	 that	 data	 necessarily	 required	
collaboration,	a	 creative	approach	 to	problems,	and	an	 inter‐disciplinary	open‐
mindedness	that	many	modern	economists	simply	lack	(Piketty,	2014:	pp.	574‐5).	
He	places	his	work	in	the	tradition	of	“political	economy”	which,	“may	seem	rather	
old‐fashioned	but	to	my	mind	conveys	the	only	thing	that	sets	economics	apart	
from	the	other	social	sciences:	its	political	normative	and	moral	purpose,”	(Piketty,	
2014:	p.	574).				
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The	context	of	critique				
	
It	is	important	in	assessing	the	positive	contribution	of	Piketty’s	book	to	bear	in	
mind	just	who	it	was	written	for.	Piketty	is	an	economist	and	his	core	anticipated	
audience	 would	 likely	 be	 other	 economists,	 and	 principally	 mainstream	
economists.	 In	 this	 context	 the	 book	 is	 radical.	 It	 places	 an	 empirical	 question	
mark	against	standard	assumptions	of	wealth	distribution	effects,	it	uses	methods	
typically	eschewed	by	mainstream	economists,	it	takes	an	interest	in	institutions,	
and	 it	 doesn’t	 assume	 that	 problems	 in	 a	 market	 system	 simply	 take	 care	 of	
themselves	over	the	long	term.	The	data	produced	is	an	invaluable	resource	for	all	
researchers	interested	in	inequality.	For	example,	Olivier	Giovannoni	at	the	Levy	
Institute	draws	on	Piketty’s	dataset.	In	a	recent	working	paper	he	calculates	that	
the	labour	share	of	the	99%	in	the	United	States	has	reduced	by	15%	since	1980	
and	 in	 2012	 this	 amounted	 to	 a	 $1.8	 trillion	 transfer	 from	 labour	 to	 capital,	
reducing	 the	 US	 labour	 share	 to	 its	 1920s	 level	 (Giovannoni,	 2014).	 As	Wade	
(2014)	notes	this	shift	in	who	gets	what	is	not	occurring	in	a	failed	state	in	some	
global	backwater	where	a	corrupt	government	and	a	predatory	set	of	corporations	
pillage	 the	 population	 in	 some	 exceptional	 fashion.	 It	 has	 become	 the	 normal	
context	 of	 “advanced”	 capitalism,	 an	 advanced	 capitalism	where	we	have	been	
encouraged	over	recent	decades	to	celebrate	this	context	as	the	consequence	of	a	
dynamic	 process	 of	 rewards	 to	 wealth	 creators.	 Those	 who	 question	 this	 are	
accused	 of	 practicing	 the	politics	 of	 envy	 and	of	 flying	 in	 the	 face	of	 economic	
progress.			
	
It	is	in	terms	of	addressing	the	ideological‐economic	constructions	associated	with	
the	idea	of	wealth	creators	and	progress	that	Capital	seems	most	important.	And	
it	is	in	these	terms	that	much	of	its	appeal	beyond	economics	seems	to	lie.	Capital	
brings	issues	of	ethics	and	justice	to	the	fore.	Economists	typically	evade	these,	
despite	that	any	economic	decision‐making	involves	rules	for	decisions	and	these	
have	a	context.	The	context	is	usually	bracketed	as	a	normative	issue	for	others	
whilst	 the	economist	 focuses	on	what	 is	economically	rational	 in	ways	that	are	
often	highly	unrealistic,	and	which	ignore	that	the	rational	has	a	rationale	and	is	
itself	 an	 ethical	 stance	 (a	 form	 of	 unstated	 utilitarianism,	 which	 is	 also	 often	
violated	 in	 terms	 of	 its	 own	 tests).	 Piketty’s	 analysis	 is	 important	 because	 it	
creates	a	bridge	to	inequality	as	a	problem	of	justice,	the	book	has	“moral	purpose”.		
	
The	implication	of	Piketty’s	work	is	that	what	is	economically	reasonable	and	thus	
ought	to	be	allowable	should	flow	from	what	is	explicitly	ethically	reasoned	and	
justified.	 Piketty’s	 great	 contribution	 is	 his	 empirical	 findings.	 The	 gains	 from	
growth	over	the	last	thirty	years	have	been	mainly	captured	by	the	top	decile	and	
within	that	by	the	1%	and	0.1%.	This	raises	the	important	question:	on	what	basis	
has	 the	 income	 from	 growth	 been	 captured?	 It	 has	 not	 been	 by	 work	 in	 any	
reasonable	 sense.	 It	 has	 been	based	 on	 inheritance	 and	ownership	 of	 financial	
assets	 that	 create	 a	 return,	 and	 it	 has	 been	 based	 on	 power	 –	 the	 power	 to	
command	 one’s	 own	 income	 from	 “work”	 and	 by	 control	 over	 huge	 assets	
(corporations).	So,	Piketty’s	analysis	allows	one	to	argue	that	the	returns	to	the	
wealthy	 have	 not	 been	 about	 returns	 to	merit	 through	 labour,	 but	 rather	 as	 a	
product	of	the	social	power	conferred	by	capital	and	by	class	position.	This	allows	
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one	to	reframe	the	problem	away	from	the	idea	that	wealth	flows	naturally	to	an	
undifferentiated	dynamic	class	of	entrepreneurs,	and	society	would	be	poorer	(in	
all	senses)	if	it	were	not	for	their	activity.	The	idea	that	their	wealth	is	deserved	
and	that	its	accumulation	is	a	reward,	and	by	extension	an	incentive	that	drives	
the	whole	economic	system,	begins	to	dissolve.	
	
It	dissolves	further	when	one	considers	that	the	top	echelons	have	not	become	
more	 productive	 in	 the	 last	 thirty	 years,	 so	 the	 increase	 in	 returns	 cannot	 be	
justified	as	a	simple	economic	return	based	on	scarcity	of	skills	and	the	productive	
contribution	of	those	skills.	On	the	contrary,	they	are	capturing	a	larger	proportion	
of	wealth	in	economies	that	are	growing	more	slowly	than	they	did	in	the	period	
1950‐1980.	 To	 reiterate,	 Piketty’s	major	 contribution	 is	 the	 data	 that	 provides	
ammunition	to	challenge	the	implicit	ethical	stance	of	advanced	capitalism	–	the	
conflations	and	obfuscations	of	the	cult	of	the	entrepreneur	and	of	the	confusion	
between	 wealth	 creation	 and	 capture.	 It	 provides	 the	 basis	 for	 an	 empirically	
grounded	ethical	counterargument.	It	opens	up	a	space	to	construct	an	argument	
whose	terms	of	reference	are	quite	different;	an	argument	where	many	of	the	rich	
are	undeserving,	since	many	of	them	live	off	the	returns	from	(as	well	as	some	
contribute	to	the	construction	of	the	system	of)	financial	assets,	and	where	some	
of	 those	 assets	 and	 the	 system	 of	 assets	 are	 part	 of	 the	 problem	 of	 modern	
capitalism’s	instability	that	harms	us	all.	It	provides	a	useful	empirical	basis	for	a	
more	 radical	 critique	 of	 parasitic	 accumulation	 of	 wealth	 and	 oligarchization,	
understood	 as	 social	 evils	 rather	 than	 virtues.	 Thus,	 the	 very	 rich	 become	 a	
societal	 burden,	 their	wealth	 illegitimate,	 their	 position	 in	 society	 unjust,	 their	
existence	as	a	group	unnecessary,	and	their	activities	a	threat	to	general	economic	
stability	and	social	justice.		Such	a	critique	is	not	personalised	–	it	does	not	focus	
on	a	single	individual	or	given	instances	of	egregious	conduct,	but	on	how	a	group	
are	able	to	act	(for	the	Harvard/Chicago	response	to	the	99%	critique	by	Occupy	
etc,	putting	the	position	of	the	1%,	see	Mankiw	2013,	and	Kaplan	and	Rauh,	2013;	
Mankiw,	2015).xv		
	
However,	though	one	can	reasonably	state	that	Piketty	provides	data	to	challenge	
the	ethical	stance	of	modern	capitalism,	and	Capital	may	in	this	sense	have	“moral	
purpose”,	the	book	is	not	a	tightly	argued	moral	case.	The	moral	force	of	the	work	
is	dissipated.	Andrew	Sayer	makes	the	moral	case	far	more	effectively	in	his	recent	
book	Why	We	Can’t	Afford	 the	Rich,	 and	does	 so	partly	based	on	Piketty’s	data	
(2014;	see	also	Dorling,	2014).	Though	he	is	aware	that	an	economy	is	also	a	social	
construct	 (Piketty,	 2014:	 p.	 55),	 he	 cannot	 quite	 shake	 the	 mainstream	
economist’s	sense	that	facts	are	neutral.	Recall	that	he	states	his	purpose	is	“not	
to	plead	the	case	of	workers	against	owners	but	rather	to	gain	as	clear	as	possible	
a	 view	of	 reality”	 (Piketty,	 2014:	p.	 40).	Consider	 also:	 “Rather	 than	 indulge	 in	
constructing	a	moral	hierarchy	of	wealth,	which	in	practice	often	amounts	to	an	
exercise	in	Western	ethnocentrism,	I	think	it	is	more	useful	to	try	to	understand	
the	 general	 laws	 that	 govern	 the	 dynamics	 of	wealth,”	 (Piketty,	 2014:	 p.	 445).	
What	Capital	 lacks,	however,	 is	 a	 sense	of	 explanatory	 force	 in	which	 facts	are	
never	neutral	because	in	the	context	of	explanation	they	have	consequences	for	
future	policy	and	conduct.		
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Capital	is	sufficiently	a	work	addressed	to	mainstream	economists	that	it	hesitates	
to	forcefully	make	the	moral	case	(if	not	for	workers	then)	for	the	99%	against	the	
1%	based	on	the	data.	Concomitantly	it	does	not	draw	out	the	implications	of	the	
existence	of	a	1%	as	a	set	of	consequences	for	society	in	any	clear	sense	(health,	
wealth,	 democracy,	 community	 etc.).	 It	 is	 rather	 different	 than	Wilkinson	 and	
Pickett’s	 The	 Spirit	 Level	 (2010),	 despite	 that	 the	 two	 are	 sometimes	 casually	
combined	in	popular	thinking.	However,	in	broader	context,	the	context	in	which	
Capital	 is	now	being	read,	it	 is	considerably	less	radical.	Here,	the	 laws	and	the	
concept	of	capital	become	important	because	they	indicate	severe	limits	in	terms	
of	what	exactly	is	being	explained	in	Capital.	The	whole	is	not	counterfeit,	but	it	is	
misleading	and	thus	dubious	in	terms	of	orientation	and	emphasis.				
						
Calibration	economics:	what	has	Piketty	really	done?	
	
Recall	 that	 Piketty	 states	 he	 is	 using	 “the	 words	 capital	 and	 wealth	
interchangeably,	as	if	they	were	perfectly	synonymous,”	(Piketty,	2014:	p.	47),	and	
that	he	defines	capital	as	the	“sum	total	of	nonhuman	assets	that	can	be	owned	
and	exchanged	on	some	market,”	(Piketty,	2014:	p.	46),	that	is	as	literally	anything	
that	 can	be	designated	as	having	a	property	 right	and	 to	which	a	 value	 can	be	
ascribed	(excluding	human	capital	and	wage	labour).	The	value	of	that	capital	is	
then	measured	based	on	its	“market	value”	established	by	being	“traded	on	some	
market,”	(Piketty,	2014:	p.	48).	As	various	critics	have	noted	this	definition	creates	
a	host	of	problems	(see	Galbraith,	2014;	Palley,	2014;	Varoufakis,	2014).	Piketty’s	
concept	of	capital	is	essentially	a	measure	of	asset	wealth	based	on	net	present	
financial	 value	 determined	 in	 markets.	 However,	 capital	 as	 a	 concept,	 in	 any	
insightful	 sense,	 is	 different	 than	 a	 current	 measure	 of	 wealth	 (for	 issues	 see	
Hodgson,	2014).	The	two	are	not	synonymous.	Capital	is	the	sum	of	goods	that,	
through	a	set	of	social	relations,	become	the	means	of	production,	and	so	capital	
goods	are	those	that	enable	economic	output.	One	does	not	need	to	be	a	Marxist	
to	 appreciate	 that	 this	 is	 an	 important	 distinction	 and	 remains	 so	 in	 terms	 of	
Piketty’s	actual	concerns.	At	the	heart	of	Piketty’s	3	laws	is	the	relation	between	
national	income	and	the	accumulation	of	wealth.	If	one	wants	to	understand	the	
potential	for	the	accumulation	of	wealth	one	must	account	for	the	way	in	which	
national	income	is	generated.	One	must	account	for	how	growth	actually	occurs,	
so	one	must	orient	on	and	distinguish	capital	from	all	other	wealth	assets	in	order	
to	fully	explain	the	historical	development	of	both.		
	
This	does	not	make	an	interest	in	the	market	value	of	any	and	all	assets	irrelevant,	
but	it	is	important	to	note	that	this	is	quite	different	than	focusing	on	the	actual	
aspects	of	an	economy	that	produce	the	potential	for	productive	wealth.	Moreover,	
maintaining	 the	 distinctions	 and	 distinguishing	 between	 capital	 and	 all	 other	
forms	of	wealth	 assets	 is	 also	 important	 because	 this	 allows	 one	 to	 grasp	 that	
differences	 make	 a	 difference,	 and	 that	 the	 dynamics	 of	 wealth	 include	 new	
relations	within	capitalism	that	affect	what	is	produced	and	how	(and	so	“how”	
affects	the	shares	of	income	based	on	wage	labour	compared	to	profit	shares).	This	
also	encompasses	different	relations	to	other	sources	of	current	wealth.	As	many	
have	noted	a	housing	bubble	is	a	consequence	of	quite	specific	relations	within	
capitalism,	it	involves	the	restructuring	of	an	economy	around	construction	and	
finance,	so	the	form	of	capital	and	the	structures	in	which	it	is	used	and	profits	are	
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created	also	change.	At	the	same	time	the	house,	though	a	potential	wealth	asset,	
is	for	the	vast	majority	the	place	one	lives	and	housing	per	se	cannot	simply	be	
dispensed	with	(it	has	no	return	in	most	contexts	even	if	its	value	is	fluctuating).	
A	house	is	not	capital	in	the	productive	sense.	However,	the	existence	of	housing	
is	 also	 the	 existence,	 within	 quite	 specific	 regulatory	 and	 rule	 systems,	 of	 a	
potential	 for	 securitisation,	 resulting	 then	 in	 opportunities	 for	 given	 financial	
organizations	(hedge	funds	etc)	and	thereby	for	the	development	of	speculative	
wealth	assets.	These	assets,	 in	 turn,	are	significant	because	of	differentials	 in	a	
broader	framework	of	global	finance	and	its	architecture.			
	
What	Piketty	has	actually	achieved	is	an	aggregated	measure	of	all	wealth	assets	
and	 how	markets	 treat	 them.	 This	 is	 important	 in	 terms	 of	making	 some	 very	
general	claims	about	the	relative	wealth	of	the	few	compared	to	the	many	and	in	
terms	of	emphasising	that	overall	the	proceeds	of	economies	are	being	captured	
by	the	few.	But	it	is	in	terms	of	the	different	aspects	of	the	relation	of	capital	to	
other	 forms	 of	 assets	 that	 the	 root	 of	 any	 explanation	 arises.	 Piketty	 is	 overly	
focused	on	simply	setting	up	the	aggregates	of	wealth.	When	viewed	in	this	light	
it	becomes	clear	that	the	3	laws	are	neither	fundamental	laws	of	capitalism	nor	in	
some	sense	deep	structures	of	 it.	They	remain,	 in	the	end,	no	more	than	highly	
conditional	 metrics,	 despite	 an	 initial	 sense	 they	 are	 the	 basis	 of	 theory.	 The	
empirics	dominate	the	577	pages	of	Capital.	In	so	far	as	the	3	laws	operate	to	give	
sense	to	the	book,	they	do	so	by	focusing	the	reader	on	calibrations.	By	this	I	mean	
the	highly	generalised	or	aggregated	relative	movements	of	one	category	in	terms	
of	another.xvi			
	
The	lasting	impression	from	reading	Capital	is	that	despite	reference	to	issues	that	
change	the	context	in	which	wealth	and	income	become	concentrated	(war	and	
institutions),	and	despite	Piketty’s	caveat	that	“We	must	be	careful	not	to	make	a	
fetish	of	numbers,”	(Piketty,	2014:	p.	93),	the	end	product	does	make	a	fetish	of	
the	numbers	 to	 the	detriment	of	appropriately	developed	explanation.	 It	 is	 the	
calibrations	that	seem	to	matter	most.	This	is	also	made	clear	if	one	considers	the	
significance	of	the	metrics.		
	
Consider	the	role	of	r	>	g.	Piketty	does	not	just	aggregate	all	forms	of	wealth	assets	
he	 conforms	 their	 return	 profiles	 to	 a	 single	 number.	 This	 involves	 both	
obfuscation	and	a	slight	of	hand.	There	is	no	reason	why	the	return	profiles	of	all	
possible	assets	will	move	in	the	same	direction	at	the	same	time.	Some	tend	to	be	
strongly	divergent	because	of	standard	investment	systems	(bonds	and	equities,	
gold	and	almost	everything,	currencies	and	commodities	combined	in	hedge	and	
carry	 trades),	 some	 experience	 singular	 bubble	 effects	 based	 on	 historical	
conjunctures	(housing),	and	these	can	be	common	to	some	economies	but	rarely	
universal	to	all	(see	Baker,	2014).	As	such,	to	aggregate	all	forms	of	return	into	a	
single	 figure	 is	 highly	 problematic.	 It	 obfuscates	 regarding	 the	 variations	 in	
specific	 return	profiles	and	 thus	 in	 terms	of	 the	actual	 sources	of	 the	return.	A	
focus	on	a	relatively	constant	and	long	term	return	rate	gives	the	impression	that	
the	 rate	 itself	 is	 the	 significant	 issue,	 caveats	 notwithstanding,	 rather	 than	 its	
many	and	different	causes.	The	metric	becomes	the	actual	mechanism	rather	than	
a	measure.		
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It	is	important	to	bear	in	mind	that	Piketty’s	aggregate	r	has	to	be	derived.xvii	It	
does	not	exist	anywhere	in	the	data.	This	results	in	a	subtle	shift	in	the	way	the	
concept	is	underpinned	by	Piketty.	Piketty	defines	capital	as	the	market	valuation	
of	all	assets	and	so	the	 initial	 implication	 is	 that	 the	return	 is	a	combination	of	
market	value	fluctuations	and	income	streams	tied	to	those	assets.	In	order	to	fix	
a	relatively	constant	return	to	capital	Piketty	introduces	a	standard	neoclassical	
approach	in	Chapter	Six.	Though	he	initially	criticises	the	adequacy	of	the	Cobb‐
Douglas	 production	 function	 he	 ultimately	 chooses	 to	 adopt	 it	 based	 on	 an	
elasticity	of	substitution	of	capital	for	labour	between	1.3	and	1.6	(Piketty,	2014:	
p.	221).	The	adoption	of	this	model	and	substitution	means	that	the	expansion	of	
capital	in	national	income	is	now	referenced	in	a	model	that	is	about	the	return	to	
capital	 goods,	 and	 this	 is	 different	 to	 the	original	 definition	of	 capital	 given	by	
Piketty	(nor	is	the	model	about	capital	as	a	social	relation,	despite	being	focused	
on	 physical	 product).	 It	 does,	 however,	 lead	 to	 the	 implication	 that	 there	 is	 a	
constant	rate	of	return	and	to	the	inference	that	it	can	be	higher	than	growth.	But	
this	is	at	the	expense	of	realism.	The	production	function	is	a	standard	and	highly	
unrealistic	 neoclassical	model.	 It	 assumes	 that	 changes	 are	 determined	 by	 the	
relative	marginal	productivity	of	technology	and	of	labour.	Not	only	is	this	model	
deterministic,	it	requires	the	assumption	that	wages	are	simply	a	given.	As	such,	
in	order	for	the	model	to	be	constructable	one	must	put	aside	any	variation	in	the	
way	technology	is	really	integrated	into	a	productive	process	and	the	way	in	which	
wages	are	determined	(through	bargaining	and	through	the	failures	to	be	able	to	
bargain)	and	unemployment	 is	actually	caused.	So,	as	Varoufakis	(2014)	points	
out,	one	must	put	aside	core	institutional	features	of	a	capitalist	economy.		
	
To	a	non‐economist	this	may	not	seem	that	important.	But	it	is.	The	only	reason	
to	adopt	a	neoclassical	production	function	to	underpin	the	original	argument	is	
to	give	some	degree	of	determinacy	to	β	and	r	(creating	periodised	regularities).	
The	only	reason	one	would	want	to	do	so	in	this	way	is	to	translate	the	general	
insights	into	a	form	that	has	some	reference	point	for	mainstream	economists.xviii	
But	the	point	of	reference	is	not	clearly	compatible	with	the	original	definition	of	
capital	and	the	focus	on	wealth	assets,	the	model	itself	has	no	basis	in	‘fact’,	even	
if	 the	 data	 to	which	 it	 is	 referred	 is	 good	 data,	 and	 so	 the	model	 undermines	
Piketty’s	 claim	 to	 be	 concerned	 with	 facts.	 Moreover,	 the	 model	 is	 simply	
incompatible	with	the	further	claim	Piketty	quite	plausibly	makes	that	institutions	
matter	for	who	gets	what	in	a	capitalist	system	(particularly	the	most	wealthy).	
Juxtaposing	 a	 neoclassical	 production	 function	 with	 acknowledgements	 that	
institutions	‐	rules,	regulations,	 laws,	habits,	and	cultures	 ‐	 impact	on	shares	of	
national	income	does	not	establish	that	the	two	can	be	integrated.	This	leads	to	a	
final	 consideration	 regarding	 the	 general	 coherence	 of	 Piketty’s	 approach	 to	
explaining	wealth	and	income	inequality	and	to	offering	a	solution.	
	
What	Capital	is	not	
	
Piketty’s	laws	are	not	explanations,	and	when	one	carefully	works	through	them	
it	is	clear	they	are	not	really	intended	to	be	explanatory.	What	they	are	is	a	set	of	
interconnected	mathematical	 statements	 that	 express	 changes	 in	 aggregates	 of	
particular	metrics.	The	laws	are	mechanisms	but	not	in	the	sense	of	accounting	for	
something,	merely	in	the	sense	of	producing	a	machine	that	processes	numbers.	
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Moreover,	 the	 basis	 of	 the	 laws	 is	 compromised	 by	 the	 use	 of	 a	 neoclassical	
technique	(however	that	is	later	justified,	see	Piketty,	2014a;	Piketty,	2015),	and	
the	overall	statement	of	the	laws	tends	to	confuse	the	reader	by	conflating	capital	
with	all	forms	of	wealth,	and	capital	with	the	current	market	valuation	of	wealth	
assets.	However,	though	not	an	explanation,	the	laws	are	used	to	add	authority	to	
the	 central	 claim	 that	 capitalism’s	 normal	 state	 is	 one	 where	 wealth	 does	
accumulate	and	concentrate,	and	where	inequality	increases.		
	
For	Piketty,	inequality	is	the	unadulterated	normal	in	capitalism	and	constraints	
on	 the	 growth	 of	 this	 inequality	 are	 an	 exception,	 in	 so	 far	 as	 they	 are	 non‐
necessary.	However,	consider	what	this	actually	means	in	terms	of	the	coherence	
of	a	theoretical	stance.	To	argue	that	in	the	absence	of	war,	or	in	the	absence	of	
specific	 institutional	 forms,	 growing	 inequality	 becomes	 a	 tendency	 does	 not	
explain	the	existence	of	inequality	in	the	absence	of	war	or	specific	institutional	
forms.	It	merely	suggests	that	different	conditions	apply	in	the	absence	of	those	
specific	institutions	and	events.	But	those	different	conditions	are	also	the	product	
of	institutions	within	the	social	relations	of	capitalism.	So,	Piketty’s	way	of	framing	
the	 problem	 inadvertently	 makes	 one	 set	 of	 institutional	 conditions	 within	
capitalism	more	basic	than	another.	However,	this	is	a	problematic	implication	for	
many	reasons	(see	also	Acemoglu	and	Robinson,	2015).	
	
First,	 it	 conflates	 prior	 with	 more	 basic.	 A	 period	 of	 inequality	 of	 wealth	 and	
income	may	have	occurred	historically	prior	to	one	that	is	more	egalitarian	but	
that	 does	 not	 make	 the	 institutional	 conditions	 that	 enable	 inequality	 more	
fundamental.	 Second,	 it	 tends	 to	 conflate	 duration	with	 primacy,	 the	 historical	
duration	of	periods	of	inequality	may	be	longer	but	again	this	does	not	make	the	
institutional	conditions	that	enable	inequality	more	fundamental.	Note	here	that	
the	 duration	 is	 based	 initially	 on	 few	 cases.	 It	 is	 the	 existence	 of	 institutional	
conditions	that	enabled	inequality	in	those	few	isolated	longer	historical	cases	for	
which	 data	 could	 exist	 that	 lends	 credence	 to	 the	 sense	 that	 the	 long	 term	
underlying	 state	 of	 capitalism	 involves	 the	 tendency	 for	 inequality	 to	 increase.	
Third,	in	order	to	make	the	case	that	one	set	of	institutional	conditions	are	more	
basic	than	another	–	that	they	are	normal	and	that	any	alternative	is	an	exception	
‐	it	is	necessary	to	actually	set	out	those	institutions	and	then	to	explain	how	and	
why	 they	 are	 ‘normal’.	 This	 requires	 one	 to	provide	historical	 detail	 regarding	
institutions,	but	also	meta‐historical	and	presumably	explanatory	mechanisms	by	
which	 capitalism	 reverts	 to	 “deep	 structures”.	 This	 requires	 a	 historically	
informed	 theory	 of	 power	 in	 capitalist	 relations,	 this	 far	more	 than	 laws	 as	 a	
metrics	exercise	would	make	sense	of	the	data.		
	
However,	 any	 effective	 attempt	 to	 explore	 such	 theory	would	quickly	 come	up	
against	the	problem	that	Piketty’s	core	claims	trade	on	the	ambiguous	status	of	
normal.	The	inferences	drawn	from	prior	and	from	duration	lend	credence	to	the	
sense	 that	 inequality	 is	 normal,	 but	 normal	 then	 further	 implies	 that	 the	
institutional	conditions	of	that	inequality	are	of	trans‐historical	significance.	They	
are	a	something	to	which	a	system	returns.	By	contrast,	periods	that	place	a	break	
on	 inequality	 are	 exceptional,	 and	 non‐necessary.	 But	 this	 implies	 that	 the	
institutional	 conditions	 of	 inequality	are	 necessary.	 At	 the	 same	 time	 they	 are	
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contingent,	because	history	and	the	data	show	that	a	return	 is	not	a	rerun	and	
alternatives	exist.xix		
	
The	basic	point	 is	 that	Piketty’s	 argument	 inadvertently	 reifies	one	aspect	of	 a	
system	that	exhibits	at	least	two	tendencies.	The	tendency	for	inequality	to	rise	
and	 the	 tendency	 for	 this	 to	 be	 offset,	 confronted	 and	 challenged.	 Piketty	
recognizes	 the	 two	 aspects	 and	 is	 actually	 intent	 on	 providing	 evidence	 and	
argument	(albeit	with	caveats	and	a	degree	of	hesitation)	 for	the	 latter,	yet	the	
theoretical	whole	 trades	 on	 the	 primary	 significance	 of	 the	 former.	 There	 is	 a	
problem	 of	 consistency	 here.	 Inequality	 is	 neither	 more	 basic	 nor	 more	
fundamental.	 It	 is	a	contingent	outcome	of	 institutional	enablement	that	allows	
the	 wealthy	 to	 transmit	 wealth	 and	 to	 capture	 income,	 and	 this	 is	 done	 in	
particular	ways	 in	different	places	and	at	different	times.	All	 that	Piketty	really	
means	is	that	in	the	absence	of	effective	challenges	to	the	interests	of	the	wealthy,	
the	wealthy	will	mobilise	their	wealth	as	a	form	of	influence,	and	exercise	power	
to	 augment	 their	 own	 interests,	 and	 this	 will	 result	 in	 general	 in	 institutional	
arrangements	 that	 enable	wealth.	 This	 is	 not	 a	 profound	 insight	 into	 the	 deep	
structures	of	capitalism	it	is	simply	truistic,	and	a	bit	simplistic,	i.e.	more	wealth	
generates	more	power,	and	more	power	generates	more	wealth,	ad	infinitum.	His	
laws	do	not	take	one	beyond	this,	but	the	impression	is	given	that	they	do.	On	first	
reading	Capital	it	is	easy	to	be	seduced	by	its	relentless	focus	on	the	data	and	the	
reference	to	the	3	laws	and	thereby	confuse	tracking	some	issues	historically	and	
rendering	a	theory	of	history	that	accounts	for	those	issues.	Piketty	has	achieved	
the	former	and	not	the	latter.		
	
What	is	lacking	is	a	deeper	sense	that	any	system	and	particularly	a	human	system	
is	a	process	and	so	is	always	changing.	It	exhibits	some	degree	of	continuity,	it	may	
at	times	and	for	periods	reproduce	similar	but	not	identical	states	of	affairs,	and	
this	 may	 occur	 without	 the	 underlying	 causes	 of	 those	 states	 of	 affairs	 being	
identical.	 It	may	also	be	profoundly	transformed.	Put	another	way,	systems	are	
complex,	historical,	processual	and	dialectical.	There	is	no	sense	of	this	in	Piketty’s	
work.	Yet	this	is	the	major	insight	one	would	draw	from	political	economy	in	terms	
of	how	to	construct	a	coherent	theory	to	support	and	guide	the	way	an	empirical	
argument	is	pursued.	Despite	Piketty’s	stated	sympathy	for	political	economy,	his	
work	is	economics	with	some	discussion	of	politics,	it	is	not	political	economy	(see	
Milonakis	and	Fine	2009;	Lawson,	2003).				
	
Here,	there	are	numerous	resources	one	might	draw	on	that	might	have	enhanced	
the	theoretical	insight	of	Capital.	Its	account	of	history	might	have	drawn	on	the	
work	of	Hobsbawm	and	its	sense	of	historical	conflict	through	process	might	have	
drawn	on	Marx,	Marxists,	regulation	theory,	systems	theory,	contemporary	global	
political	economy,	realist	social	theory	or	philosophy	and	so	forth.	Piketty	does	
show	some	interest	in	Marx,	but	his	interest	is	essentially	technical	(e.g.	Piketty,	
2014:	pp.	9‐10).xx	He	 shows	none,	 for	example,	 in	Polanyi	and	his	 concept	of	 a	
double	 movement	 (Polanyi,	 1944).	 A	market	 system	may	 well	 result	 in	 social	
organization	being	 reconfigured	as	a	 set	of	 institutions	around	 that	 system	–	a	
market	 society;	 but	 this	 is	 never	 complete,	 it	 always	 involves	 provocations	 to	
control	 the	 adverse	 consequences,	 injustices,	 and	 relative	 harms	 that	 arise.	
Neither	 is	 more	 necessary	 or	 fundamental	 to	 human	 existence,	 and	 each	 has	
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consequences	 for	 the	 other.	 So,	 for	 Polanyi	 the	 liberal	 state	 is	 a	 product	 and	
consequence	of	the	emergence	of	market	society.	Its	potentials	are,	therefore,	not	
an	 exception	 but	 an	 internal	 response.	 Still,	 in	 a	 certain	 sense,	 Piketty’s	work,	
taken	sympathetically,	might	be	read	as	a	resource	intended	to	enhance	the	breaks	
on	 a	 market	 system	 within	 a	 market	 society,	 and	 so	 be	 part	 of	 that	 internal	
response.	 Still,	 Piketty	 seems	 subject	 to	 Polanyi’s	 comment	 that	 “Nowhere	 has	
liberal	philosophy	failed	so	conspicuously	as	in	its	understanding	of	the	problem	
of	 change,”	 (Polanyi,	 1944:	 p.	 41).	 In	 his	 recent	 International	 Sociological	
Association	address	Michael	Burawoy	contrasts	Polanyi	with	Piketty	and	states	
regarding	Piketty’s	work:		
	
He	 has	 no	 theory	 of	 politics,	 no	 theory	 of	 the	 state,	 no	 theory	 of	 social	
movements,	no	theory	of	culture	and	above	all,	no	theory	of	capitalism.	He	
has	a	formula	for	increasing	inequality	but	the	factors	behind	the	variables	
(rate	 of	 return	 and	 economic	 growth)	 are	 left	 unexplained.	 (Burawoy,	
2014:	p.	12)		
	
Burawoy’s	 overriding	 concern	 is	 not	 to	 advocate	 Polanyi’s	 work	 in	 some	
unadulterated	 fashion,	 but	 rather	 to	 suggest	 any	 adequate	 account	 of	 modern	
capitalism	must	 have	 an	 internal	 sense	 of	 both	 particular	 causes	 and	 general	
processes.	 Polanyi,	 for	 example,	 did	 not	 foresee	 a	 new	market	 fundamentalist	
countermovement	of	the	type	we	have	witnessed,	nor	did	he	clearly	distinguish	
different	 sources	 of	 resistance	 to	 it	 –	 those	 arising	within	 the	 state	 and	 those	
arising	within	civil	society,	notably	social	movements	(Burawoy,	2014:	p.	22,	26‐
8).	
	
One	might	 think	 that	 focusing	 on	 additional	matters	 of	 theory	 in	 terms	 of	 the	
absence	of	adequate	concepts	that	account	for	change	etc	do	not	matter	a	great	
deal	here.	Piketty	 is	an	economist	and	not	a	sociologist.	His	work	 is	 in	 the	end	
empirical,	whilst	these	matters	of	theory	are	of	mere	academic	concern.	But	this	
is	not	 so,	 adequate	 theory	 is	 crucial.	Empirical	 easily	becomes	empiricism,	and	
empirical	work	without	adequate	explanation	can	lead	to	an	inadequate	focus	on	
solutions,	since	these	flow	from	how	one	explains	the	sources	of	a	problem.		
	
It	is	certainly	the	case	that	when	read	as	a	book	by	an	economist	for	economists	
the	focus	of	theoretical	 interchange	and	the	language	of	theory	in	Capital	make	
sense	–	discussion	of	Kuznets,	of	neoclassical	production	functions	etc.	Yet	there	
is	 a	 significant	 difference	 in	 terms	 of	 acknowledging	 that	Capital	 is	 a	 work	 of	
persuasion	seemingly	targeted	at	a	given	audience,	and	accepting	that	the	work	
has	broader	significance	as	is.	Clearly,	one	wants	to	avoid	the	gnomic	pursuit	of	
theory.	 Complexity	 as	 academic	 artifice	would	do	 a	 disservice	 to	 the	 empirical	
importance	of	 the	subject	matter	of	 inequality.	But	Piketty	situates	his	work	as		
“systematic	 and	methodical”	 and	 lays	 claim	 to	 be	 in	 the	 pursuit	 of	 “scientific”	
inquiry,	albeit	imperfectly	(see	Piketty,	2014:	p.	3).	One	can	then	easily	be	lulled	
into	conflating	a	data	exercise,	supported	by	“laws”,	with	the	thought	that	the	facts	
of	inequality	are	now	fully	accounted	for	in	an	appropriate	frame	of	reference.	In	
this	sense	theory	really	does	matter.	It	matters	because	it	gives	sense	to	where	the	
explanatory	force	of	facts	lie	and	what	this	entails.		
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As	several	 leading	post‐Keynesians	have	argued,	Capital	 lacks	 specific	 focus	on	
and	then	explanation	deriving	from	the	particular	sectors	primarily	responsible	
for	 the	 sharp	 increase	 in	 returns	 to	 capital	 and	 the	 accumulation	 of	 wealth	
(Galbraith,	2014;	Palley,	2014).	It	also	lacks	a	proper	sense	of	the	actual	national,	
regional	and	global	socio‐economic	systems	that	have	provided	the	framework	in	
which	particular	sectors	have	become	significant	(Baker,	2014).xxi	For	example,	in	
the	United	States,	large	retail	multinational	corporations	have	expanded	over	the	
neoliberal	 period	 and	 have	 done	 so	 based	 on	 long	 supply	 chains	 and	 global	
outsourcing,	thus	increasing	the	subordination	of	production	to	the	power	of	the	
retail	 sector.	 In	 the	context	of	neoliberal	approaches	 to	employment	rights,	 the	
relative	expansion	of	employment	in	this	sector	has	enabled	a	general	rise	in	the	
profit	share	relative	to	labour	share	of	corporate	income	(in	turn	becoming	part	
of	relative	shares	of	national	income).	So,	if	one	were	committed	to	addressing	the	
relative	share	flowing	to	capital,	an	effective	policy	here	would	be	to	improve	the	
specific	institutions	for	collective	bargaining	and	worker’s	rights	in	this	sector.							
		
The	 existence	 of	 many	 specific	 policy	 approaches	 highlights	 that	 there	 is	 a	
question	mark	against	the	logic	of	argument	that	leads	to	the	global	wealth	tax.	
This	does	not	make	a	 focus	on	global	 issues	 irrelevant	–	 since	some	aspects	of	
capitalism	are	part	of	global	system	dynamics	(e.g.	investment	flows	undertaken	
by	 multinational	 corporations,	 including	 financial	 corporations,	 since	 this	 has	
many	ramifications	based	on	transfer	pricing	and	reporting	for	corporation	tax,	
local	 employment	 conditions,	 international	 employment	 competition	 that	
depresses	 wages,	 the	 potential	 for	 securitisation	 etc).	 However,	 Piketty’s	
particular	 argument	 makes	 a	 global	 wealth	 tax	 appear	 a	 necessary	 solution	
because	the	focus	of	Capital	is	on	an	aggregated	metric.	It	is	ownership	of	capital	
as	financial	assets	writ	large	that	is	identified	as	the	problem.	As	such,	the	implicit	
line	of	reasoning	is	that	many	sources	and	types	of	capital	are	aggregated	in	one	
measure	 of	 capital,	 and	 this	 then	 implies	 that	 there	 is	 one	 problem	 of	 capital	
subject	 to	 one	 solution	 to	 that	 problem	 (see	 Piketty,	 2014:	 p.	 534).	 But	 the	
requirement	 of	 a	 universal	 and	 global	 solution	 only	 follows	 if	 the	 problem	 is	
actually	universal	and	globally	uniform	in	its	sources.	It	may	be	possible	and	in	
some	ways	meaningful	to	provide	an	aggregate	measure	of	capital	that	is	universal	
and	uniform,	 but	 this	 then	makes	 the	possibility	 of	 the	 aggregate	measure	 the	
reason	 to	 orient	 on	 a	 single	 solution,	 and	 this	 seems	 to	 be	 a	 fallacy	 of	
representation	if	not	of	analysis.		
	
This	is	not	to	argue	a	global	wealth	tax	has	no	appeal,	but	to	reveal	that	it	needs	to	
be	 carefully	 conceived	 (see	 Patomaki,	 2014)	 and	 justified.	 Consider	 why	 one	
would	want	to	orient	on	a	global	wealth	tax	as	the	main	or	primary	conclusion	of	
a	book	intended	to	be	the	definitive	work	on	wealth,	income	and	inequality.	Recall	
that	Piketty	states	his	purpose	is	“not	to	plead	the	case	of	workers	against	owners”	
(Piketty,	 2014:	 p.	 40),	 that	 “he	 has	 no	 interest	 in	 denouncing	 inequality	 or	
capitalism	per	se”	(Piketty,	2014:	p.	32),	and	that	the	point	of	his	low	level	global	
wealth	tax	is	not	“to	finance	the	social	state	but	to	regulate	capitalism.	The	goal	is	
to	stop	the	indefinite	increase	of	inequality	of	wealth”	(Piketty,	2014:	p.	518).		
	
Piketty’s	global	tax	is,	despite	the	controversy	it	provoked	from	the	political	right,	
a	 conservative	 policy,	 and	 as	 such	 a	 palatable	 form	 of	 radicalism.	 The	 tax	 is	
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perfectly	compatible	with	an	extremely	limited	restriction	on	asset	accumulation	
in	order	to	halt	the	escalating	levels	of	inequality.	As	a	policy	it	is	also	a	focus	on	
taking	 back	 rather	 than	 preventing.	 A	 focus	 on	 taking	 back	 tends	 to	 imply	
redistribution,	but	this	then	requires	the	state	to	redistribute	(and	Piketty	is	not	
countenancing	 financing	 the	 social	 state,	 though	 he	 is	 also	 supportive	 of	
progressive	income	tax,	see	Piketty,	2014:	pp.	481‐484).	Moreover,	redistribution	
is	a	highly	limited	approach	to	addressing	the	problem	of	inequality.	It	potentially	
leaves	in	place	many	of	the	institutions	within	a	market	system	that	give	rise	to	
inequality,	and	so	might	quickly	be	overcome	through	policy	capture	and	reversal	
because	 of	 its	 own	 limited	 ambition.	 Given	 that	 Piketty’s	 main	 theoretical	
contribution	is	to	highlight	(without	exploring)	the	power	of	wealth	to	reproduce	
its	own	interests	 this	 is	surely	a	major	problem	for	his	advocacy	of	 the	 tax	–	 it	
would	seem	to	demand	a	greater	and	more	rigorous	transformation	of	institutions	
and	institutional	power	in	addition	to	the	tax,	rather	than	the	introduction	of	the	
tax	as	an	alternative	to	such	transformation.			
	
As	Robert	Wade	notes,	Capital	says	little	about	the	power	dynamics	through	which	
inequality	actually	arises	and	how	these	can	be	challenged.	These	are	 far	more	
controversial	practical	issues	of	predistribution,	of	unionisation,	collective	rights,	
and	of	community	empowerment.xxii	These	would,	of	course,	have	made	the	book	
far	more	controversial	given	its	intended	audience	of	economists.	But	they	are	not	
controversial	 in	a	broader	context.	They	are,	 from	an	alternative	perspective,	a	
part	of	adequate	solutions	to	the	real	problems	stated	–	including	the	long	term	
significance	 of	 debt‐dependent	 societies	 and	 inherently	 unstable	 financialised	
economies	 (see	 e.g.	 Palley	 2012;	 Galbraith	 2012).	 If	 one	 considers	 the	 social	
movements	that	have	sprung	up	in	the	wake	of	the	global	financial	crisis,	they	have	
been	motivated	by	a	deep	sense	of	injustice	regarding	the	very	state	of	society	and	
the	role	of	 the	economy,	and	not	simply	by	one	visible	consequence	–	growing	
wealth	and	privilege.	So,	whilst	Piketty	may	have	been	embraced	as	a	voice	for	the	
left	and	for	social	movements,	one	should	be	careful	here	to	consider	just	how	far	
his	work	can	be	an	adequate	source	for	those	movements.	It	is	in	this	context	that	
Palley	states:																					
	
[T]hese	 things	 need	 to	 be	 said.		 Shared	 values	 and	 shared	 analysis	 are	
different.		 Shared	values	 can	 create	 short‐term	agreements	 that	obscure	
long‐term	conflicts	inherent	in	differences	of	reasoning.		Ideas	matter	and	
failure	to	articulate	ideas	truthfully	can	have	dire	consequences.		Academic	
economists	 have	 an	 obligation	 to	 state	 the	 theoretical	 issues	
clearly.	Piketty's	 book	 is	 an	 academic	 treatise	 with	 public	 policy	
implications,	which	means	it	is	right	to	point	out	its	neoclassical	tendencies	
[…]	(Palley,	2014:	pp.	145‐146)	
		
Conclusion	
	
Consider	what	the	actual	major	problems	of	our	time	are.	They	are	not	income	and	
wealth	 inequality	 per	 se,	 though	 these	 are	 significant	 issues.	 It	 is	 poverty	 and	
continued	environmental	harm	and	human	insecurity	that	are	more	urgent.	It	is	
easy	to	forget	that	there	is	no	necessary	equivalence	between	“can	we	afford	the	
rich?”	and	“how	do	we	prevent	the	poor?”.	If	Piketty’s	work	leads	to	a	global	wealth	
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tax	that	slows	down	and	then	halts	inequality	along	conservative	lines	this	will	do	
little	substantively	to	address	the	structural	causes	of	difference	that	give	rise	to	
poverty.	Again,	the	work	is	not	irrelevant	–	even	the	OECD	(2014)	recognizes	that	
developing	countries	tend	to	fair	better	where	inequality	is	lower.	Inequality	does	
matter.	As	recently	claimed	by	Oxfam	(and	the	claim	uses	the	World	Top	Incomes	
Database)	the	85	richest	people	in	the	world	now	own	wealth	equivalent	to	the	
bottom	3.5	billion	(Oxfam,	2014).	But	using	the	data	on	which	Capital	is	built	is	
different	than	suggesting	Capital	is	an	appropriate	guide	for	solutions.		
	
A	break	on	wealth	accumulation	is	not	a	different	way	of	constituting	capitalism.	
Concomitantly,	we	are	already	in	need	of	a	different	way	of	constituting	capitalism	
if	 we	 are	 to	 address	 the	 basic	 environmental	 disaster	 we	 seem	 to	 be	 blithely	
heading	towards.	It	seems	curious	that	Piketty	can	make	forecasts	across	a	whole	
century	regarding	growth	and	make	only	passing	reference	to	the	need	to	solve	
the	carbon	problem	and	no	mention	as	to	whether	growth	ought	to	be	an	aim	at	
all	(Piketty,	2014:	p.	95).		
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i		For	prior	context	see	Citigroup’s	plutonomy/plutocracy	2005‐6	and	Lazonick	(2013).	
ii	For	examples	of	lavish	praise	from	prominent	economists	and	commentators	see	Krugman	2014a,	
2014b;	Wolf,	 2014;	 Solow,	 2014;	 Erlanger,	 2014.	 The	 Economist	 provided	 an	 initially	 neutral	
review,	January	2014a,	but	then	became	more	hostile	May	2014b,	where	Piketty	becomes	a	radical	
socialist/Marxist,	an	accusation	repeated	in	the	Wall	St	Journal,	where	Shuchman	(2014)	refers	to	
Capital	as	a	‘bizarre	ideological	screed’.	The	Financial	Times	also	began	a	critique	of	Piketty’s	data	
in	May	(Giles,	2014)	but	this	came	to	little	following	a	detailed	response	by	Milanovic	(2014)	and	
also	Piketty.		
iii	“It	is	by	no	means	certain	that	inequalities	of	wealth	are	actually	increasing	at	the	global	level:	as	
the	poorer	countries	catch	up	with	the	richer	ones,	catch‐up	effects	may	for	the	moment	outweigh	
the	forces	of	divergence,”	(Piketty,	2014:	p.	438)	
iv	There	 is	 a	broader	database	 that	 tracks	 estimated	world	output	growth	 rates	 and	 returns	 to	
capital	across	two	millennia	(Piketty,	2014:	pp.	73,	354,	356‐7)	
v	Though	Piketty	makes	it	clear	that	the	decline	in	income	share	is	not	a	result	of	significant	growth	
in	the	relative	labour	income	of	the	rest	of	society	compared	to	the	top	10%	even	during	the	period	
of	exception.	This	is	one	reason	why	there	is	no	simple	and	enduring	Kuznet	effect	to	be	found	in	
the	data.	
vi 	One	 can	 get	 a	 continual	 update	 from	 the	 World	 Top	 Incomes	 Database.	 This	 remains	 an	
invaluable	publically	accessible	source	made	freely	available	for	dissemination	by	the	contributors,	
including	Thomas	Piketty.	No	criticism	of	Capital	militates	against	this.		For	the	material	stated	so	
far	see:	
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vii	The	book	has	many	useful	summaries.	For	example:	“Two	points	need	to	be	clarified	at	once.	
First	we	 find	this	regularity	 in	all	countries	 in	all	periods	 for	which	data	are	available,	without	
exception,	and	the	magnitude	of	the	phenomenon	is	always	quite	striking.	To	give	a	preliminary	
idea	of	the	order	of	magnitude	in	question,	the	upper	10	per	cent	of	the	labour	income	distribution	
generally	receives	25‐30	per	cent	of	total	labour	income,	whereas	the	top	10	per	cent	of	the	capital	
income	distribution	always	owns	more	than	50	per	cent	of	all	wealth.”	(Piketty,	2014:	p.	244)	
viii	I	have	omitted	reference	in	the	following	to	net	figures	and	relative	populations	in	order	to	keep	
the	explanation	simple.	
ix	Even	the	copyeditor	seems	to	have	become	exhausted	by	the	length	and	gravity	of	the	work:	“all	
needs	should	by	paid	for	through	taxation”	(Piketty,	2014:	p.	482).	
x	However,	see	Piketty,	2014:	p.	574	
xi	And	where	the	recognized	“unequal	returns	on	capital	are	a	force	for	divergence	that	significantly	
amplifies	and	aggravates	the	effects	of	the	inequality	r>g.”	(Piketty,	2014:	p.	431)		
xii	Piketty	notes	that	the	long	term	cumulative	effects	of	these	growth	rates	are	more	significant	
than	the	public	realise,	which	is	one	reason	why	people	think	growth	rates	are	higher	(in	addition	
to	the	variation	between	states	rather	than	as	a	world	output	possibility	frontier).	An	annual	rate	
of	1.5%	over	thirty	years	accumulates	to	more	than	50%	growth	 in	national	 income	or	output.	
(Piketty,	2014:	p.	95)	
xiii	“In	the	standard	economic	model,	based	on	the	existence	of	a	“perfect”	market	for	capital	(in	
which	each	owner	of	capital	receives	a	return	equal	to	the	highest	marginal	productivity	available	
in	the	economy,	and	everyone	can	borrow	as	much	as	he	or	she	wants	at	that	rate),	the	reason	why	
the	 return	 on	 capital,	 r,	 is	 systematically	 and	 necessarily	 higher	 than	 the	 growth	 rate	 g	 is	 the	
following.	If	r	were	less	than	g,	economic	agents,	realizing	that	their	future	income	(and	that	of	
their	 descendents)	 will	 rise	 faster	 than	 the	 rate	 at	 which	 they	 can	 borrow,	 will	 feel	 infinitely	
wealthy	and	will	therefore	wish	to	borrow	without	limit	in	order	to	consume	immediately	(until	r	
rises	above	g).	In	this	extreme	form,	the	mechanism	is	not	entirely	plausible,	but	it	shows	that	r>g	
is	 true	 in	 the	most	 standard	of	 economic	models	 and	 is	 even	more	 likely	 to	 be	 true	 as	 capital	
markets	become	more	efficient.”	(Piketty,	2014:	p.	360)		The	implicit	argument	is	that	standard	
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models	are	not	fully	correct	but	they	do	support	the	existence	of	r>g	so	they	are	therefore	relevant	
as	a	point	of	departure.		
xiv	Note,	this	is	different	than	Piketty’s	support	for	a	progressive	income	tax	
xv	There	are	numerous	arguments	one	might	make	–	though	most	miss	the	point	in	terms	of	context	
and	possibilities.	For	example,	the	rich	are	the	main	single	group	within	most	advanced	capitalist	
countries	tax	base,	despite	issues	such	as	tax	evasion.	As	of	2013,	in	the	UK	the	top	1%	accounted	
for	30%	of	income	tax	revenues	and	the	top	10%	for	59%.	This	compares	with	11%	and	35%	in	
1979.	So	they	actually	seem	to	contribute	more	than	was	the	case	in	a	period	of	higher	taxation	
(Smith,	2014).			
xvi	Calibration	 is	 used	 slightly	 differently	 in	 econometrics	 –	 there	 it	 usually	 refers	 to	 adjusting	
variables	to	create	outcomes	either	without	data	or	in	ways	that	condition	any	subsequent	data.	
Piketty’s	laws	are	not	quite	this	–	see	subsequent	sections.	
xvii	Here,	Galbraith	(2014)	provides	a	useful	deconstruction	of	the	maths:	since	α	is	the	share	of	
profit	 in	 total	 income,	which	 can	 be	written	 as	 P	 for	 profit	 and	Y	 for	 income	or	 P/Y;	 and	α	 is	
calculated	as	α	=	r	x	β;	where	β	is	the	capital	or	k	ratio	of	income	Y,	then	one	can	write	P/Y	=	r	x	
K/Y	and	rearrange	this	as	r	=	P/Y	÷	K/Y;	if	one	then	cancels	Y	then	one	is	left	with	r	=	P/K.	r	is	then	
revealed	 to	 also	 be	 highly	 contingent	 because,	 if	 one	 factors	 in	 tax	 on	 profits	 and	 also	 some	
consumption	from	profits	then	one	can	easily	demonstrate	r	at	2.5%	rather	than	5%.				
Varoufakis	(2014)	highlights	a	whole	set	of	associated	problems	of	assumptions	in	the	laws.	For	
example,	the	second	law	requires	net	savings	to	feed	fully	into	aggregate	wealth;	it	may	be	that	
savings	 rates	are	 falling	but	 the	value	of	 capital	 rising	because	of	market	 effects	 (including	 for	
example,	intra‐financial	multiplication).		
xviii 	Piketty	 has	 subsequently	 stated	 that	 he	 did	 not	 intend	 his	 discussion	 of	 the	 neoclassical	
production	function	and	its	specific	substitution	rate	to	be	read	in	the	way	it	has	been.	The	point	
was	to	address	a	neoclassical	audience	in	terms	they	would	understand	and	to	show	that	even	if	
one	 accepted	 their	 highly	 unrealistic	 model	 then	 problems	 of	 inequality	 still	 arise	 over	 time.	
(Piketty	2014a).	However,	if	this	was	his	only	intention	then	he	failed	to	convey	that	effectively	in	
Capital.		
xix	The	thrust	of	Piketty’s	argument	is	also	that	capitalism	has	no	inherent	mechanisms	that	prevent	
concentrations	 of	 wealth	 and	 income.	 But	 what	 makes	 something	 inherent	 in	 a	 system	 like	
capitalism?		Why	are	mechanisms	of	concentration	inherent	whilst	those	that	prevent	this	are	not?	
Capitalism	 may	 have	 basic	 capacities	 and	 defining	 social	 relations	 but	 the	 actual	 distribution	
within	this	is	contingent	on	the	institutions	that	arise.	This	is	fundamental	to	Sraffa	and	Robinson’s	
position	 in	 the	 Cambridge	 Controversy	 that	 Piketty	 also	 curiously	misrepresents	 (see	 Sraffa’s	
Production	of	Commodities	by	Commodities).			
xx	Piketty’s	use	of	Marx	fails	to	read	through	the	technical	issues	to	see	the	underlying	purpose	in	
a	constructive	way.	It	is	easy	for	an	unwary	reader	to	approach	Piketty’s	concept	of	capital	as	one	
that	 is	 basically	 Marxist	 and	 refers	 to	 a	 class.	 Recall:	 “Very	 soon,	 however,	 capital	 began	 to	
reconstitute	 itself.	 The	 growth	 of	 capital’s	 share	 accelerated	 with	 the	 victories	 of	 Margaret	
Thatcher	 in	 England	 in	 1979	 and	 Ronald	 Reagan	 in	 the	 United	 States	 in	 1980,	 marking	 the	
beginning	of	a	conservative	revolution	[…]	By	2010,	and	despite	the	crisis	that	began	in	2007‐2008	
capital	was	prospering	as	it	had	not	done	so	since	1913.”	(Piketty,	2014:	p.	42)	
xxi 	Even	 the	 possible	 issue	 of	 a	 transnational	 capitalist	 class	 is	 not	 pursued	 despite	 the	
acknowledgement	that	“financial	globalization	has	made	it	more	difficult	to	measure	wealth	and	
its	distribution	in	a	national	framework:	inequality	of	wealth	in	the	twenty	first	century	will	have	
to	be	gauged	more	and	more	at	the	global	level.”	(Piketty,	2014:	p.	346)	It	seems	curious	that	a	data	
constraint	is	used	to	then	ignore	a	problem	of	explanatory	relevance.		
xxii	Piketty	does	not	address	the	way	MNCs	have	effective	monopoly	power,	nor	how	this	translates	
into	systems	of	political	patronage	and	policy	capture,	especially	in	democracies	where	political	
campaigning	and	party	activity	is	not	publically	funded	and	private	interests	are	not	curtailed;	he	
says	nothing	about	issues	of	privatisation	versus	nationalisation	for	natural	monopolies	and	for	
welfare	goods;	nor	does	he	address	the	living	wage,	the	minimum	wage,	citizen’s	income	or	the	
way	tax	systems	privilege	rentier	activity	in	general	(capital	gains	tax,	the	tax	status	of	debt	etc);	
or	how	the	whole	architecture	of	regional	institutions	is	currently	configured	to	punish	any	given	
state	that	attempts	to	place	its	people	before	its	existing	financial	commitments	–	anti‐austerity	
policies	are	not	wrong	per	se	–	they	are	simply	denied	the	scope	to	succeed	on	their	own	terms	(as	
Greece	is	currently	finding	in	its	negotiations	with	the	ECB);	nor	does	Piketty	address	what	it	might	
mean	to	definancialise	an	economy.		
	
